an obstacle to this emancipatory project because it presents technology as a juggernaut, unresponsive to human efforts, leaving us doomed to submit to the enveloping power of technology and fated to an inevitable technological enslavement. His harshest criticism of essentialism is saved for Martin Heidegger, who he sees as its progenitor; pointing to his enframing (Gestell) and standing-reserve (Bestand) arguments as particularly disempowering, promoting inaction or a "politically dehabilitating substantivism" (see Thomson 2000: 435) in the face of the many inequities and challenges presented by contemporary technology. 2 Alternatively, Feenberg endorses and describes a constructivism that he understands will allow for positive human intervention into the development and design of technology, directing it toward a free and equal society.
In this paper, I would like to reconsider whether essentialism, as articulate by Heidegger and others, is guilty of this charge of determinism and whether it can provide a viable response to the challenge of technology, overcoming its oppressive and dehumanizing character. On the face of it, determinism suggests a need to accept or submit to our technological fate and, in turn, the futility of any political, social, or private response. Therefore, it is worth considering why and how Heidegger can both be reconciled to the unavoidable advance of technology and still present the possibility of a human contribution to a more authentic existence unobstructed by its enframing power.
Overall, I identify three Heideggerian responses to the challenge of technology: 1) an "aggressive" essentialism, i.e., the elimination or restriction of technology; 2) a "moderate" essentialism, i.e., the modification or reform of our relationship to technology; and 3) a "passive" essentialism, i.e., the acceptance that we cannot act against or direct technology. Admittedly, the discussion that follows merely introduces or scratches the surface of these three categories. This said, I propose that this classification of essentialism might be used to help articulate the various roles essentialism plays in the wider scope of the philosophy of technology literature: the aggressive response appears today as neo-Luddism; the moderate response appears in an authentic artifact movement; and the passive response appears in efforts to renew philosophical discussion of technology itself.
A few notes of caution before I continue. First, my identification of these three essentialisms should not be interpreted as corresponding to a periodizing of Heidegger's analysis of technology into so-called early, middle and late stages. Despite common reference to such periods, I hold that there is no fundamental "turning" in Heidegger's understanding of technology but instead a "unity of thought" (see Olafson, 1993 and also Gilbert-Walsh 2003: 54) . Heidegger is consistent throughout his corpus: the essence of technology is enframing. What does change, however, is the way he thinks we can respond to the challenge of enframing. It is in these changing responses to the challenge of technology that we find the three essentialist responses rather than in a changing understanding of technology itself. So, for example, while Heidegger ultimately rejects National Socialism as a way to overcome the challenge of technology, he nowhere rejects his preconceived goals of the Nazi project. Again, the analysis of technology is the same while the response changes. This leads to a second caution: any exploration of the political aspects of Heidegger's analysis of technology risks wading into the fierce debate over his Nazism. 3 However, my intention is not explore the overarching consistency or inconsistency of his thought and politics, but I think much more modestly to highlight the fact that Heidegger does describe responses to the challenge of technology. 4 4 In an exchange of letters, Herbert Marcuse pleads with Heidegger to renounce or clarify his Nazi associations, "But we cannot make the separation between Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man…" (Wolin, 1993: 161) . 5 When he writes of authenticity, he imagines the recovery of a lost sense of tragedy, an embrace of mortality, and an acceptance of the unseen and mysterious. The English word 'authentic", associated with words such as integrity and genuineness, comes from the Greek authentikos meaning principal or authoritative. The related authenticus means "comes from the author" or original. However, these etymologies give only a small insight into Heidegger's use of the German word Eigentlichkeit. Literally translated as something close to "ownmostness" or "that which is my own" (eigen), Heidegger poses authenticity in opposition to Uneigentlichkeit, inauthenticity or that which is not my own (uneigen) (see Being and Time, Division 1, section 9). Eigentlich means actual, intrinsic, or proper. In turn, Eigentlichkeit can be translated as "properness". Furthermore, eigentlichkeit can also be connected to another Heideggerian term, Ereignis, meaning enownment or the way things "come-into-their-own". Overall, Heidegger's authenticity suggests an openness to the return of essence or an original way of existence. Clearly, then, authenticity does not imply self-creation or even self-improvement because both seem selfish or individual pursuits, unconnected from the unconcealment of being. 6 For example, Feenberg attacks Heidegger for a lack of consideration for the actual design of devices (2000: 297, note 4). 7 As Paul Farwell explains, "Because Dasein lacks absolute control over the world it was born into, it can achieve its authenticity only in terms of the choices, things, and opportunities this particular world offers. Dasein can not create ex nihilo a new world of meaning since the significance of anything is determined prior to any choice on the part of an individual Dasein. (As Heidegger stresses, the world is 'always and already' meaningful). For this reason, no drastic transition occurs once Dasein becomes authentic…We should keep in mind that Heidegger focuses mostly upon the ontological dimension of authenticity, i.e., the
I Essentialism
As already suggested at the beginning of the paper, essentialism is by no means limited to Heidegger or the philosophy of technology. In the broadest terms, essentialism simply implies that things have an "essence." Rather than being artificial or accidental, all objects whether rocks, houses, horses or people have a quality, character or nature intrinsic to their being which distinguishes them from all other things. In his Metaphysics, for example, Aristotle explains, "the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself" (1029b14). Similarly, in the first chapter of On Being and Essence, Thomas Aquinas notes, "essence signifies something common to all natures through which the various beings are placed in the various genera and species." Twentieth century existential philosophers challenge this notion. Jean Paul Sartre argues that we have no predetermined essence, concluding instead that "existence precedes essence" (1946) . For Sartre, we construct our essence rather than being born with it.
It follows that essentialist philosophers of technology such as Heidegger hold that technology has an essence whereas critics of essentialism adopt a more Sartrian view. In his 1954 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger comes to the infamous conclusion that the essence of technology is itself nothing technological (1993a: 311). While seemingly contradictory, Heidegger is making a rather straightforward point. Rather than merely the cumulative weight of different technologies or the "technological" (e.g. computers, cars, and weapons), the essence of technology is basic structures of Dasein which make authenticity possible, and much less the nature of any specific the overarching characteristic common to all technologies; it is the thing which distinguishes technology from all other things as is the case with the essence of anything.
Heidegger articulates his overall understanding of essentialism; explaining that essence is more than just the visible qualities or characteristics of a given thing. It includes both the seen and the unseen because all beings have an essence that comes into being and goes out of being. This is also described as an unconcealment (aletheia) and concealment (lethe), a disclosure and hiding, a presencing and absencing or, more starkly, birth and death. 8 Informed by Aristotle, Heidegger explains that all essence participates in a larger movement, movedness, or "emerging power" of nature or physis. Now, the essence of technology is unique or distinctive in that, rather than indicating a parity of essence and nature, it instead challenges nature. Like all other things, the essence of technology also unconceals and conceals itself. But, unlike any other coming into being or revealing of essence, the unconcealment of the essence of technology is characterized by the concealment of the essence of all other beings or what Heidegger calls Gestell, "enframing." Just as the hydroelectric damn on the River Rhine submerges the Rhine River valley, technology as a whole obscures the rest of existence. Everything is taken as standing-reserve (Bestand) -"stuff" to be manipulated and formed rather than things with a given nature. This means that the unconcealment of the essence of technology (existentiell) act which is authentic " (1989: 82) . 8 In his General Introduction, David Krell notes the distinction between Sein, meaning "coming to presence", and alethia, meaning disclosedness or unconcealment (1993a: 32). This said, both still are part of the movedness of physis.
takes the "movedness" of nature and replaces it with the singular presence of technology. 9
For Heidegger, this challenge of technology has been ongoing for the last 2,500-years beginning with Plato's articulation of metaphysics. 10 In light of this unique playing out of the essence of technology, our present age is even more unique in that this epochal challenge is about to end with a final taking up of human beings as standing-reserve. 11 The concealment of human essence by the enframing essence of technology has two related and unprecedented consequences. First, the concealment of human beings by technology also entails the disappearance or concealment of the uniquely human capacity to ask the question of Being. Here we see the link between Heidegger's analysis of technology and his larger work on fundamental ontology. Second and more immediately relevant to this paper, human beings will no longer be able to notice or criticize this enframing process. Heidegger writes, "The need to ask about modern technology is presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more decisively characterizes and directs the appearance of the totality of the world and the position of man in it" (1993a: 434). It is in this silence or inability to think, act or question that we find the source of Feenberg's greatest criticism of essentialism. Because Heidegger gives us no clear or concrete indication of how we should respond to the increasingly technological character of the world and the commensurate threat to our capacity to conceive of its consequences, he is dubbed (along with other essentialists such as Jacques Ellul and Marshall McLuhan) a disempowering determinist.
Right away we can identify a basic problem with Feenberg's drawing of equivalence between essentialism and determinism. He assumes that an "essence" of technology implies autonomy or a predetermined end that cannot be influence by human intervention. Nonetheless, according to Heidegger, humans can and do participate in the way technology manifests. Even though "man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws" (Heidegger, 1993a : 323), we still have the capacity to respond appropriately when technology does reveal itself to us. The point is we must be aware or recognize that it is happening, that technology is revealing itself to us. The pressing concern for Heidegger is that we have turned our backs on all of this, under the false impression that we completely control technology even as we ourselves are being taken up by it. That is why Heidegger is not interested in predicting or prescribing the development of specific technological devices as Feenberg wants him to. When he writes, "Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be unleashed either for destructive or for peaceful purposes" (1993a: 320), he is telling us to shift our focus from good or bad, peaceful or destructive technologies to the essence of technology itself.
Interestingly, Feenberg also argues that while Heidegger's "standing-reserve" criticism or the "modern obsession with efficiency" may be an accurate description of many if not most contemporary technologies, it does not necessarily describe the way technology must and always be-"The 'essence' of actual technology, as we encounter it in all its complexity" Feenberg argues, "is not simply an orientation toward efficiency" (1999: x). For him, the efficiency obsession and all the negative consequences that go along with it stem not from some abstract metaphysical turn in Western civilization but from the actual design and use-context of technological devices. In other words, even though Feenberg and Heidegger may agree that "real dangers do lurk in modern technology" (Feenberg, 1999: x) , they disagree on the source of that danger. And, because Feenberg identifies the source in existent and adaptable social structures, his philosophy of technology allows for positive change and progress, whereas he sees no clear political or social project that comes out of Heidegger's critique. As he says, "Heidegger calls for resignation and passivity (Gelassenheit) rather than an active program of reform " (1999: 184) .
II Aggressive Essentialism
And yet, Feenberg also concludes "one finds no criteria for the transformation of modern technology anywhere in Heidegger" beyond the short-lived experiment with Nazism (2000a: 226-7). But, the very fact that Heidegger did see a possibility of transforming our relationship with technology through Nazism highlights the fact that his essentialism is not also determinism. 12 We can rightly criticize the horrific form of
Heidegger's response to the challenge of technology but we cannot also say that he was simply resigned to it. Far from it, in his embrace of the Nazis, Heidegger called for the violent recapturing of a pre-technological world through the destruction of the scientific establishment that he understood to be an obstacle to "authentic being". He comes to the astonishing conclusion that:
From a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same; the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted organization of the average man . . . The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that the nations are in danger of losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the decline (taken in relation to the history of "being"), and to appraise it as such. (2000: 436) . 13 It could also be said that this destruction allows once again for the movement of nature where before it was concealed by the enframing essence of technology. Heidegger believed that a re-embracing of prePlatonic ways of being would serve to return human beings to a more authentic existence. Rather than the instrumental rationality, sterility and humanism indicative of Plato's theory of the forms (i.e. eidos), Heidegger wanted to somehow recover a lost Hericlitean universe in flux where man is tossed "back and forth between structure and the structureless, order and mischief, between the evil and noble " (1959: 161) .
In an Introduction to Metaphysics he asks, "But if that which is an essential consequence is raised to the level of essence itself, and thus takes the place of the essence, then how do things stand?" He continues, "What remains decisive is not the fact in itself that phusis was characterized as idea, but that the idea rises up as the sold and definitive interpretation of Being" (2000: 194) . Heidegger explains that the idea or eidos is initially understood as the visible appearance of the "movedness" or "emerging power" of nature (physis). From here, physis as movedness is ignored in lieu of the superficial, unmoving eidos. Eidos becomes a paradeigma, a model or prototype rather than anything immediately apparent. Heidegger concludes, "Because the actual repository of being is the idea and this is the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation to the model, accommodation to idea" (1959: 184-5 From a long study of the original Luddites, I have concluded that there is much in their experience that can be important for the neo-Luddites today to understand, as distant and as different as their times were from ours. Because just as the second Industrial Revolution has its roots quite Roszak (1994) and David Noble (1995) . Sale explains the common bond that links these thinkers together:
Wherever the neo-Luddites may be found, they are attempting to bear witness to the secret little truth that lies at the heart of the modern experience: Whatever its presumed benefits, of speed or ease or power or wealth, industrial technology comes at a price, and in the contemporary world that price is ever rising and ever threatening (1995).
So, whether it is the danger of television, pollution, or genetic modified organisms, the neo-Luddites agree that technology is a threat to human and non-human life. In her short piece "Notes Toward a Neo-Luddite Manifesto", Chellis Glendinning But still, how can we remedy Heidegger's call for resolute action against spiritual decline with this later sense of moderation? In the rectoral address, Heidegger calls for a recapturing of "the original Greek essence of science " (1990: 473) . This recapturing entailed a move away from the contemporary effort to control nature through scientific research and technology and a return to the ancient Greek understanding of making or techne which, he claims, worked in cooperation or in partnership with nature (2000: 174).
As I explain elsewhere (Tabachnick, 2004 : 100-4), Heidegger does not disparage the products of the ancient craftsman in the same way he does contemporary technology because they are "scenes of disclosure" for overpowering nature and draw our attention to the nature of existence (see Heidegger 2000: 174) . In "The Question Concerning
Technology", the ancient craftsman's art is described as a "bringing-forth" or a working in partnership with the nature of materials to construct an artifact, such as a chair or a house, and the contemporary technologist is described as "challenging-forth" or changing the nature of materials to make them stronger, more flexible, longer lasting, etc. 17 In turn, contemporary technological artifacts do not disclose nature. And, because in a technological society so much of our world is filled with these "undisclosing artifacts", 17 In "Techne, Technology and Tragedy," I continue:
Heidegger explains that earlier human inventions did not permanently impose a new form onto nature because, under normal conditions, the material of an artifact was still bound by natural characteristics; nature would always "shine through" the imposition of the artist, craftsman or technician (see Glazebrook, 2000) . A carpenter, for example, imposes the form of a chair onto wood but once the chair is finished that wood still maintains its natural characteristics to rot and decompose in the same way a fallen tree rots and decomposes on the forest floor. In other words, the craftsman's chair is a site of openness for the revealing of nature or, as mentioned above, scenes of disclosure. In contrast, we might look to the growing list of contemporary technologies that do not co-operate with nature but attempt to replace it. A nuclear engineer can manipulate the structure of natural elements to produce artificial elements. Plutonium is designed to never abide by or return to the characteristics of the uranium from which it was derived. The character of plutonium (i.e. its level of radioactivity) is always artificial. Likewise, the genetically altered human is designed to never return to the natural characteristics of the material from which it was derived (e.g. a sick or weak body) and thus is always artificial.
we are cut off from, become unaware of, or forget the essential movedness or transience of nature, being, and existence. 18 This does not mean that Heidegger favoured a return to the simple, nostalgic world of the rural farmer of the Black Forest or the authentic ancient craftsman toiling away in his workshop. Despite the fact that Heidegger often posed wooden bridges against hydroelectric damns and peasants farming against open pit mining, the point for Heidegger is not "what" we build but rather "why" we build it. Indeed, the Pyramids and
Parthenons of the ancient world were not quaint or modest projects by any estimate and yet would still, for Heidegger, qualify as authentic artifacts. Therefore, Heidegger's non/post-technological world could still be grand and technically advanced in the same sense as these noble monuments. This seems to be what Heidegger is addressing when he proclaims as rector that, "the beginning exists still. It does not lie behind us as something long past, but it stands before us," it "has invaded our future; it stands there as the distant decree that orders us to recapture its greatness." This is a moderate essentialism because it does not require the destruction or restriction of technology but instead a return to the building of authentic artifacts.
We get a further understanding of the possibility of authentic artifacts from
Heidegger's discussion of a rural farm in "Building Dwelling Thinking." He warns, "Our reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses; rather, it illustrates by a dwelling that has been how it was able to build" (1993a: 362). Here, he explicitly rejects a nostalgic return to some pretechnological age. In this same essay, Heidegger provides a remarkable analysis of a contemporary technology that does seem to embrace some of the aspects of an authentic artifact:
The highway bridge is tied into the network of long-distance traffic, paced and calculated for maximum yield. Always and ever differently the bridge initiates the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro . . . The bridge gathers, as a passage that crosses, before the divinities -whether we explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for, their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether that divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside (1993a: 355). Of course, simply because this is the "one and only instance" of positive evaluation does not mean we must discount it. In fact, the highway bridge can be taken as an example of Heidegger' later claim that "We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse and lay waste our nature " (1966: 54 (1984: 155) . He then goes onto suggest that things such as cyclotrons, space shuttles may bear resemblance to medieval cathedrals and monuments in that they serve as "focal points" for our communities, inspiring awe and appreciation for the place of humanity in the cosmos: we can find peace and serenity in "midst of our own creations which surround us daily" (1984: 161). Borgmann and other moderate essentialists believe that by reorienting or reforming the way we relate to technology, by recognizing that it is revealing something to us, we can mitigate its threat. So yet again we see essentialism as something other than determinism. By recognizing and changing our relationship to technology, we can help determine the course technology will take.
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IV Passive Essentialism
As described above, Heidegger understood Nazism as a route to respond to the challenge of technology. And, while he moves away from this aggressive response, this
should not be taken as an admission that it was nonviable. His unwillingness to explicitly disavow the goals of the National Socialist revolution suggests that he held out the faint hope that sometime in the distant future a similar planetary effort to knock back and destroy the technological establishment would be again possible. In an oft quoted interview given well after the war, he cryptically explains that the Nazis were "far too limited in their thinking" to fully realize or take advantage of the opportunity presented to them (1977) . 21 However, Heidegger does come to critique the Nazis because their revolution became a furthering of the "dreary technological frenzy" in same sense as the American and Russian revolutions. Indeed, it is this realization that leads him to consider new ways to respond to the immediate challenge of technology.
At basis, the defeat of the Nazis brought Heidegger to question the very possibility of any contemporary political response to technology. He asks in the 1966 Der Speigel interview, "how can a political system accommodate itself to the technological 21 The full quote reads:
It seems to me that you are taking technology too absolutely. I do not see the situation of man in the world of global technology as a fate which cannot be escaped or unraveled. On the contrary, I see the task of thought to consist in helping man in general, within the limits allotted to thought, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of technology. National Socialism, to be sure, moved in this direction. But those people were far too limited in their thinking to acquire an explicit relationship to what is really happening today and has been underway for three centuries.
In or force " (1990: 72) . This is a passive essentialism, then, because it requires a stepping back from any and all activist effort to defeat or moderate technology.
Of course, it is this acceptance, detachment or passivity (Gelassenheit) that is the source of Feenberg's criticism of Heidegger's essentialism. But, Heidegger comes to recognize that no politics, no programs of reform, and no "philosophy of technology" could itself steer humanity away from the consequence of the challenge of technology:
until we ourselves are taken up as standing reserve we will not recognize the danger of our age. Heidegger writes, "The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become" (1993a:
341 (1980: 316) . Marshall McLuhan has the same concern and, like Ellul, seems to straddle the moderate and the passive positions. In The Gutenberg Galaxy, he writes, "Far from being deterministic, however, the present study will, it is hoped, elucidate a principal factor in social change which may lead to a genuine increase of human autonomy" (1992:
3 But where danger is, grows The saving power also (1993a: 340).
that will smash all machinery to bits, so we might as well sit back and see what is happening and what will happen to us …The central purpose of all my work is to convey this message, that by understanding media as they extend man, we gain a measure of control over them …If we persist, however, in our rearview-mirror approach to these cataclysmic developments, all of Western culture will be destroyed and swept into the dustbin of history (1995: 264-5) .
So, even though technology is what threatens us the most, it also the thing through which we might once again appreciate the disclosure of being. When we come to realize through our own taking up as standing reserve that we do not control the revealing of technology, but merely participate in that revealing, we may be able to return to a more authentic or free relationship with technology. Therefore, while passive, this approach is not also deterministic. In a sense, it is passivity with a purpose; helping to express the playing out of technology; whether or not it will overwhelm and conceal the essence of all other things including ourselves.
Of course, we may agree with Feenberg that the passive approach of Heidegger, Ellul, McLuhan, and Grant seems insufficient: we should take to the streets, lobby for change, and take a proactive approach against the effects of technology. But, according to the passive essentialists, in order to escape encompassing technology, we must do nothing. Otherwise, their actions will be sucked into the dynamo once more and turned out anew on the other side.
V Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced three different essentialist responses to the challenge of technology: aggressive, moderate, and passive. At the very least, I have gone some way to defend these varieties of essentialism from Feenberg's charge of determinism. If determinism is based on the principle of inevitable consequences, clearly aggressive essentialism is not guilty of being deterministic. Aggressive essentialists simply do not accept that the course of technology is impervious to human action and intervention.
Likewise, because moderate essentialists work under the assumption that the negative effects of technology can be mitigated through a process of reform, they too evade the charge of determinism. Finally, the passive essentialists, the most likely of suspects, are also able to put forward a strong defence. Their acceptance of the autonomous revealing of technology actually affects the way that revealing is articulated.
